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 We are in strong agreement with many of the conclusions of Fields’s discussion 
[this issue], and would like to expand the theoretical context for his arguments in or-
der to offer some further interpretations. Accordingly, in our commentary, we will 
introduce some historical and developmental considerations in an effort to situate 
Fields’s position within developmental theory more broadly. Such contextualization 
will help clarify how Fields’s arguments relate to extant frameworks for modeling de-
velopment – including our own action-based framework.
 There are many things to commend this paper and it is a welcome contribution 
to developmental theory. Fields highlights some of the issues and complexities in-
volved with object representation and object re-identification in an effort to demon-
strate the inadequacy of a core aspect of nativist theory; specifically, that the appeal 
from nativists to a principle of object persistence is theoretically empty and fails to 
provide researchers with an explanation of  how children are able to actually segregate 
and re-identify objects. Fields applies the modeling power of programs and their da-
ta structures to account for object persistence from within a computational frame-
work – a framework that is generally shared by nativist researchers. If Fields’s conclu-
sions are correct, this means that nativist arguments for the necessity of  innate object 
representations (and thus the persistence principle) are unsound. We agree that in-
ternal inconsistencies in nativist theory are particularly damaging [Allen & Bickhard, 
2011a], but we disagree with Fields about the implications of such criticism. In par-
ticular, programs are a marked improvement over principles, but we suggest the need 
to go beyond  both principles  and programs in order to adequately model cognitive 
and developmental phenomena. Epistemic agents are open systems that must interact 
with their environment to exist, and modeling their ontology and development from 
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within a computational framework is inherently at odds with these dynamical inter-
active systems considerations. Instead, we suggest that an (inter-)action-based dy-
namical framework is required [Bickhard, 2009a, b].
 Nativism 
 The idea that innate principles provide a necessary foundation for development 
has been at the core of nativist theory for the last half a century [Chomsky, 1965]. In 
developmental psychology, nativist researchers have used looking paradigms to sup-
port two related strands of nativism:  constraint nativism [Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; 
Keil, 1981; Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber, & Jacobson, 1992] and  content nativism 
[Baillargeon, 1987a, b; Carey, 2009; Wynn, 1992]. While the first of these maps most 
closely onto Chomsky’s [1959, 1965] poverty of the stimulus argument, the second 
has found its most powerful arguments in the work of Fodor [1975].
 Constraint nativism, as advocated by developmentalists, is characterized by the 
argument that learning (as unconstrained induction) cannot account for actual de-
velopmental performances; therefore, innate principles provide a  necessary founda-
tion that narrows the space of possible inductions such that it is possible for infants 
to learn. In contrast, content nativism is characterized by the argument that learning 
(as hypothesis construction)  must presuppose the representational contents that con-
stitute the building blocks for the hypotheses in the first place. Therefore, content 
nativism is primary because it provides the combinatorial building blocks that form 
the foundation for subsequent learning. Whether the construction of those building 
blocks into hypotheses also takes place within an innately constrained space of pos-
sibility is secondary. Thus, constraint nativism presupposes content nativism, and so 
it is the innateness of representational content that will be the focus of our subsequent 
analyses.
 Developmental Origins and Foundationalism 
 Fields avoids issues concerning the ‘‘provenance’’ of knowledge because he as-
sumes that neuroscientific implementation is the crucial explanatory criterion that is 
needed in order to understand and model development. While we agree with his ef-
forts to integrate neuroscience into developmental theory, we disagree with his as-
sumption that this is the crucial explanatory criterion. Further, to  require that a neu-
roscientific account be provided in order for an explanation of knowing to have the-
oretical substance is at odds with Fields’s own computational framework: One of the 
‘‘virtues’’ of computationalism is supposed to be that functional states can be imple-
mented by a brain, a computer, or the population of China, and therefore, that neu-
roscience is not necessary for explaining cognition. Whether or not this is the case, 1 
 1 Actually, we reject the possibility of a hard distinction between brain as hardware and mind as 
software but that is because we strongly disagree that information processing and computation is the 
proper framework for trying to model developmental systems that are thermodynamically far from equi-
librium [Allen & Bickhard, 2013b]. 
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we think it is a crucial mistake to focus on neuroscientific  implementation to the  ex-
clusion of the developmental issues regarding  origins .
 A consequence of sidestepping the developmental issues concerning origins is 
that it makes it difficult to fully appreciate the nativist’s appeal to innate principles. 
Nativism is a response to a question about the origins and development of knowledge. 
Specifically, nativism purports to be a necessary consequence of the failure of em-
piricism to provide an adequate explanation for how we could learn all that we know 
about the world through perceptual experience alone. In developmental psychology, 
nativists understand their research program as attempting to ‘‘empirically’’ charac-
terize the ‘‘core’’ parameters of the  innate starting state such that learning and devel-
opment are possible [Carey 2009; Spelke & Newport, 1998]. Although nativists differ 
from empiricists in terms of the size and richness of that innate starting state, they 
share with empiricists in their commitment to a representational foundationalism – a 
foundation of representational atoms in that starting state [Allen & Bickhard, 2011a]: 
Foundationalism is the assumption that knowledge is built up from a base set of rep-
resentational primitives. 2 
 Nativists tend to claim that a foundationalism of  object level representations is 
necessary while empiricists tend to claim that  perceptual level ‘‘feature’’ representa-
tions are sufficient to account for subsequent learning of such object representa-
tions [Allen & Bickhard, 2013a]. Part of the reason that the ‘‘property’’ of object 
persistence has been a central focus for the debate between nativist and empiricists 
is because that property does not seem to be perceptually available in a way similar 
to other properties (e.g., color or shape). Further, nothing about the associations 
(no matter how non-linear and complex) between the perceptually available feature 
representations would seem to account for the ‘‘property of persistence.’’ In this 
sense, nativist theory is intrinsically tied to what empiricism cannot account for. 
Nativists argue by elimination that, because empiricist models do not account 
for aspects of mind that are not available to perception, those aspects cannot be 
learned – those aspects must be innate primitives that are part of the foundational 
starting state.
 Fields’s argument is important because it suggests that nativist conclusions re-
garding object persistence are premature, not because standard association style em-
piricism works, but rather, because ‘‘programs’’ are more powerful than associations 
as an ontology for modeling the nature of representation and learning. That is, Fields 
goes beyond associations (and principles) to demonstrate the power of programs to 
account for object persistence. If object representations can be constructed as ‘‘object 
files,’’ then programs can construct object representations out of feature representa-
tions (unlike associations), and innate ‘‘object’’ representations are not necessary. So, 
taking programs seriously would seem to undermine nativist arguments. Develop-
mental nativists would still have left as grounds for their position(s) their ‘‘empirical’’-
based arguments about how knowledge of object properties seem to be present from 
very early ages, but those, as has been pointed out, turn on rich interpretations of data 
 2 Fields describes as ‘‘somewhat paradoxical’’ Spelke’s statement about a theory’s explanatory value 
not being dependent on the content it assigns to the initial state; however, in the context of foundational-
ism, her claim makes more sense. If all researchers are committed to the assumption of a base set of rep-
resentational primitives, then Spelke is correct that theoretical differences about the particular size or 
richness of those contents do not demarcate the basic legitimacy of subsequent explanation. 
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and design that beg the question [Allen & Bickhard, 2013a; Haith, 1998; Müller & 
Overton, 1998].
 Fields’s computational approach to the problems of object segmentation and 
re-identification forces a more sophisticated appreciation of what sorts of issues 
those problems involve. For example, the original frame problem has been around 
for more than 40 years, but developmental researchers have rarely considered it an 
issue that is relevant to their interests [Bickhard, 2001; Heal, 1996]. Fields uses the 
frame problem to highlight that the ‘‘possible causal histories’’ relevant for object re-
identification are unbounded and cannot be specified a priori. As a consequence, 
humans  must deploy heuristics that themselves have to be learned through experi-
ences with particular types of situations and circumstances. Accordingly, the devel-
opment of object knowledge becomes a matter of learning about the ‘‘best’’ heuristics 
for successful segmentation and re-identification, and persistence is understood 
as a  computational phenomenon: Persistence is a property of the computational 
 system.
 Although Fields demonstrated that nativist arguments miss some of the impor-
tant power of programs over empiricist associations – in effect, he argues that na-
tivists try to squeeze ‘‘program’’ power into ‘‘principles as axioms’’ – he does not go 
beyond programs. Most important from our perspective, he is still left with feature 
‘‘empirical bits,’’ but with no model of them beyond information semantics, which 
does not work [Bickhard, 1993, 2009b]. In general, there is a common underlying 
empiricist framework among ‘‘empiricists,’’ nativists, and Fields, but, as Fields’s ar-
gument points out, with underappreciated and poorly explicated notions of how 
those empirical pieces are organized. Historically, the organizational means were 
originally associations and now the ‘‘powerful’’ organizational means are programs, 
but with little understanding of how much and what sort of differences that move 
makes. For our purposes, the crucial difference between these positions and our 
own is that they do not, and cannot, address the issue of representational emer-
gence.
 Action as an Alternative to Nativism and Empiricism 
 Accounting for the nature and origins of representation has always been at the 
core of the nativist-empiricist debate. Although nativists continue to interpret Pia-
get’s model of object representation as being empiricist [Carey, 2009], Piaget consis-
tently argued against such approaches in an effort to transcend both empiricism and 
rationalism by arguing for a ‘‘tertium quid’’ or ‘‘third way’’ [Müller, Carpendale, & 
Smith, 2009]. The key to understanding Piaget’s action-based alternative is emer-
gence. Nativism and empiricism both presuppose some form of foundationalism and 
thereby do not address how any such foundation could emerge and we argue that the 
models of representation on offer cannot, in principle, model representational emer-
gence [Bickhard, 2009b]. Thus, it is the possibility of emergent representation that 
provides the crucial contrast for how Piaget’s model transcended the foundationalism 
of both nativists and empiricists.
 An (inter-)action-based approach to cognition and development is the only 
known framework that is able to account for representational emergence. From this 
perspective, knowledge is constituted by interactive competence, and learning about 
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the world means learning how to interact with it competently. While Piagetian theo-
ry is the major example of such an action-based approach, we will draw from the in-
teractivist model of representation [Bickhard, 2009a, b] 3 in order to briefly outline 
some contrasts with Fields’s assumptions about the nature of object representation 
and re-identification.
 For interactivism, representation is fundamentally constituted by anticipation. 
Anticipations are functional indications of possible future interactions given appro-
priate environmental conditions. If a system engages in one of the indicated possi-
bilities, then it implicitly predicates that the current environmental conditions are, in 
fact, appropriate to support the interaction. If, however, the environmental condi-
tions are not appropriate, then the interaction will fail, and the implicit predication 
about the environment will have been shown to be in error – i.e., the anticipation is 
falsified. In this sense, the interactivist model captures two essential epistemological 
properties of representation:  truth value and  aboutness. However, in all cases, ‘‘detec-
tion’’ of the environmental conditions does not require that they be represented, let 
alone represented as particulars. 
 Interactivism draws on the notion of implicit definition to demonstrate how de-
tection can be separated from representation [Bickhard, 2009b]. Consider that the 
internal outcome state of a system (after interacting with an environment) will dif-
ferentiate those types of environments that leave the system in  that internal outcome 
state from those that leave it in some other outcome state. For example, for a system 
with only two internal outcome states, A and B, interactions with certain environ-
ments will leave the system in outcome state A while other environments will result 
in B. These internal outcome states serve to differentiate A-type environments from 
B-type environments. Importantly, the differentiation process is inherently abstract, 
unbounded, and implicitly defined by the internal organization of the system. The 
system has no explicit knowledge of the environments that it has differentiated, and 
consequently, detection does not need to involve representation.
 The interactivist model of representation opens up the possibility that an infant 
could detect and/or track an object without that necessarily indicating ‘‘persistent 
objecthood.’’ It also means that infants could successfully re-identify objects (and 
people) prior to the capacity to represent the world in terms of objecthood. Infants 
do eventually come to represent the world in terms of persistent objects, but that is a 
developmental accomplishment that unfolds over the first 2 years [Piaget, 1954]. For 
interactivism, the development of object representation is a matter of learning to or-
ganize the interactive possibilities afforded by objects such that they form an invari-
ant web of mutually reachable anticipations. 4 For a toy block, the interaction possi-
bilities will include visual scans, hand manipulations, and mouthing explorations. 
However, full object representation also requires that children have learned the class 
of transformations under which such webs remain invariant (i.e., recoverable). These 
transformations will include visible and invisible displacement [e.g., Piaget, 1954] as 
 3 For interactivism, the emergence of representation from action takes place within the broader nor-
mative context of dynamical interactive systems that are able to functionally contribute to their own self-
maintenance [e.g., Allen & Bickhard, 2011b]. 
 4 The interactivist model of object representation borrows heavily from Piaget’s model. Such bor-
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well as occlusion and containment ‘‘events’’ [e.g., Baillargeon, 2008]. However, not 
all transformations will maintain the web of interactive possibilities. For example, if 
the block is burned or pulverized, the collection of interactive possibilities that previ-
ously existed is no longer recoverable.
 In short, object representation is constituted by a web of mutually reachable in-
teractive possibilities that remains invariant with respect to a large class of transfor-
mations. Persistence is manifest in the invariance of the web of interactive possibili-
ties and in terms of that web being recoverable through appropriate intervening steps 
(e.g., I must first open the box to recover the toy).
 Summary 
 Fields focuses on implementation not origins, but the origins of nativism are lo-
cated in issues about the origins of representations. His narrower focus is on organi-
zation of empirical atoms – nativism argues that object representations must be in-
nate. In contrast, Fields argues that persistence is a computational phenomenon and 
that programs can construct ‘‘object files,’’ thus, nativism about object representa-
tions is not necessary. All such positions, however, assume basic empiricist atoms.
 Action-based approaches provide a powerful alternative to the foundationalist 
assumption common to both nativist and empiricist frameworks. Only an action-
based framework is able to account for the emergence of representation from a base 
that is not itself already representational. Accordingly, an action-based approach to 
representation in general and object representation in particular has implications for 
understanding persistence. In convergence with Piagetian theory, the interactivist 
model outlined above suggests that object persistence is itself a developmental phe-
nomenon that involves increasing representational complexity over the first 2 years 
of an infant’s life. 
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